TOWARD DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE
OCEAN FLOOR
Stephen Gorove*
The idea of an arms control agreement for the seabed is, in
a sense, a response to recent technological developments which are
making the environment of the seabed increasingly accessible to
men. As the technical and scientific capabilities develop and
improve, the chances for the use of the ocean floor as a new area
for the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction will correspondingly increase.
The significance of reaching an agreement on arms control
for the seabed has grown out of several basic considerations. First,
in line with the idea of preventive disarmanent or nonarmanent,
it was thought that there was intrinsic merit in seeking an
agreement to forestall a nuclear arms race on the seabed before
it developed. Second, even if such an agreement did not eliminate
existing military competition, it was hoped that it would have
certain positive psychological and political effects upon the
international scene.' Also, such agreement was regarded as a
logical follow-up to the treaties on the Antarctica 2 and Outer
Space.3 For these reasons the United States was interested in
working out an international agreement that would prohibit the
emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of
4
mass destruction on the seabed.
International negotiations regarding an arms control
agreement for the seabed have taken place in the Eighteen-Nation
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1. See the statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament

at Geneva on March 25, 1969, by Gerard Smith, head of the U.S. Delegation to the
Conference. 60 DEP'T STATE BULL. 333, 335 (1969).
2. The Antarctic Treaty, June 23, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71.

3. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.

4. See statement made on March 28, 1969, before U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction by David
H. Popper, U.S. representative to the Committee. 60 DEP'T STATE BULL. 342, 343 (1969).
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Disarmament Committee in Geneva.' In addition, the United
Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limit of National Jurisdiction has also been
requested to study the problem of reservation exclusively for
peaceful purposes of the seabed, taking into account the ongoing
international negotiations on disarmanent1
The arms control discussions before the Disarmament
Committee led to a Draft Treaty submitted jointly by the United
States and the Soviet Union on October 7, 1969. 7 Following
further deliberations and suggestions a revised Draft Treaty was
submitted for approval to the United Nations General Assembly8
which-after some heated debates-sent the revised Draft Treaty
(hereinafter referred to as "revised Draft") back to the
Disarmament Committee for reconsideration.'
The purpose of this inquiry is to analyze the provisions of the
revised Draft with special regard to the surrounding policy
objectives, expectations and criticisms. The various provisions
may be conveniently scruitinized under the general headings of (I)
scope and geographical coverage of the prohibition, (II)
verification procedures, and (III) miscellaneous provisions
relating to amendment, review, and entry into force.

I.

PROHIBITION: SCOPE AND GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE

The first paragraph of Article I of the revised Draft Treaty
prohibits any party from emplanting or emplacing any objects
with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the
seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the
maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva
5. Id. The Committee's membership rose from 18 to 25 but in view of France's
refusal to take her seat only 24 countries participated.
6. See the statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament
at Geneva on March 25, 1969, by Gerard Smith, head of the U.S. Delegation to the
conference. 60 DEP'T STATE BULL. 333, 336 (1969).
7. See Draft Treaty on Prohibiting Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on Seabed and
Ocean Floor, submitted by the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, October 7, 1969 (Doc.
CCD/269), U.N. Doc. A/7741 [hereinafter referred to as Draft Treaty]. See also the
statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on
October 30, 1969, by U.S. representative James F. Leonard, 61 DEP'T STATE BULL. 480
(1969).
8. See Revised Draft Treaty (Doc. CCD/269/Rev.).
9. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1969 at 6.

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone." The
prohibition extends to structures, launching installations or any
other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using
such weapons. In addition, the third paragraph of the same article
prohibits each party from assisting, encouraging, or inducing any
state to commit actions outlawed by the treaty and from
participating in any other way in such actions. Several
observations may be made with respect to the scope and
geographical coverage of this prohibition.
A.

Scope

The prohibition incorporated in Article I does not involve a
ban on all military activities on the seabed but relates only to
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, or
structures associated with such weapons: In the course of the
negotiations many nations have criticized this limitation and
called for a broader agreement prohibiting the use of the ocean
floor for all military activities in order to attain a wider
realization of the objective of reserving the ocean floor exclusively
for peaceful purposes. It was felt by a number of nations that the
ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction was a common heritage
of mankind and as such it was to be used for the benefit of all
mankind and reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes."
The Soviet Union also strongly advocated a ban on all
military activities and, in furtherance of its view, asked the United
Nations Committee on the Seabed to request the United Nations
General Assembly to call upon all states to use the seabed and the
ocean floor beyond the limits of territorial waters exclusively for
peaceful purposes. In addition, Moscow also proposed that the
General Assembly request the Disarmament Committee to
consider the question of the prohibition of the use of the seabed
2
beyond the limits of territorial waters for military purposes.'
Opposed to a general ban on all military activities was the
view of the United States government. Washington believed that
10. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, September 10, 1964, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,516 U.N.T.S. 205.
11. 6 U.N. Chronicle 79 (1969).
12. See address made at Newport, R.I., on July 12, 1968, before the Symposium on
Mineral Resources of the World Ocean by David H. Popper, 59 DEP'T STATE BULL. 171,

176 (1968).

19701

TOWARD DENUCLEARIZATION

the Soviet proposal was a deceptively simple approach to what
was anything but a simple problem. The United States felt that
the meaning of the words "for peaceful purposes" and "of
13
prohibiting the use for military purposes" was far from clear.
Thus, for instance, there was doubt whether or not sensing devices
would be regarded as military and whether or not any activity
carried out by the armed forces, such as naval research, would be
regarded as a military activity irrespective of its purpose.
Inasmuch as it was the view of the United States that the term
"peaceful purposes" did not preclude military activity generally,
Washington felt that specific limitations on certain military
activities would require negotiation of a detailed arms control
agreement."
The United States' opposition to the idea of the prohibition
to use the ocean floor for military activities also stemmed from
the fact that for some purposes, such as communication and
navigation aids, the seabed is being utilized for both military and
nonmilitary ends. Also, the existence of submarine forces requires
states to take defensive measures against such forces through
warning systems that use the seabed. Furthermore, military
personnel are frequently engaged in scientific research on the
seabed using military equipment which are not weapons. Thus,
complete demilitarization would have an effect of prohibiting
certain necessary and desirable activities. With respect to a
blanket prohibition of conventional weapons on the seabed the
United States also felt that it would raise insuperable verification
problems.' 5
Above all, Washington believed that arms control agreements
must be the product of thorough study, taking into account both
the preservation of national security interests and the particular
problems of verification and control. 6 The United States saw the
main danger of an arms race on the seabed in the possibility that
it might become a new environment in which weapons of mass
13. Id.
14. See statement made on October 29, 1968, before Committee I of the U.N.
General Assembly by U.S. representative James Russell Wiggins, 59 DEP'T STATE BULL.
554, 556 (1968).
15. See statement made on March 28, 1969, before U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction by David
H. Popper, U.S. representative to the Committee. 60 DEP'T STATE BULL. 342, 343 (1969).
16. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1969 at 7.
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destruction would be emplaced. Thus, the purpose of the United
States was to reach an agreement which would enable states under
conditions of mutual confidence to refrain from emplacing
weapons of mass destruction on the deep ocean floor in the secure
knowledge that they would not thereby be placed at a military
17
disadvantage.
The eventual text of the revised Draft was in line with the
United States position. The prohibition included in Article I did
not extend to military activities but only to the emplanting or
emplacing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction such as, for instance, biological or chemical weapons.
The ban was not intended in any way to effect the conduct of
peaceful nuclear explosions or to affect applications of nuclear
reactors, scientific research, or other nonweapons applications of
nuclear energy. Structures, launching installations or any other
facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or use of such
weapons were included in the ban. Thus the prohibition would
apply to launching platforms or delivery vehicles associated with
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction whether or
not a missile or a warhead containing a nuclear weapon or other
weapon of mass destruction was actually in place. 8 However, it
would not be applicable to research facilities or facilities for
commercial exploration that might somehow be able to
accommodate or contain a nuclear weapon. The prohibition
would most definitely apply to facilities designed to accommodate
both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons such as launching facilities
capable of firing either nuclear or conventional weapons. 9
An important question which may be raised relates to the
interpretation of the meaning of the words "emplanting" or
"emplacing." More specifically, for example, should the
17. See statement made on October 29, 1968, before Committee I of the U.N.
General Assembly by U.S. representative James Russell Wiggins, 59 DEP'T STATE BULL.
554, 557 (1968).
18. See statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva on May 22, 1969, by U.S. representative Adrian S. Fisher, 60 DEP'T STAn BULL.
520, 521 (1969). See also statement made on March 28, 1969, before U.N. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction by David H. Popper, U.S. representative to the Committee. 60 DEP'T STAi
BULL. 342, 343 (1969).
19. Statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva on October 7, 1969, by U.S. representative James F. Leonard, 61 DP'T STATE
BULL. 365 (1969).
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prohibition apply only to permanent installations affixed to or
emplanted into the seabed or should it also apply to containers
or carriers whose principal mode of deployment or operation
requires actual physical contact with the seabed? In relation to the
fornier it would appear that the prohibition would cover nuclear
mines that were anchored to or emplaced on the seabed. With
respect to the latter it may be assumed that underwater nuclear
barges or crawlers would be free to move on the ocean floor
beyond the contiguous zone inasmuch as the language of the
prohibition seems to cover only nuclear installations that are
positioned permanently on the seafloor. Thus, if a nuclear
installation weighing thousands of tons were able to crawl on the
ocean floor it would seem to be exempt from the treaty."0
By the same line of reasoning, since the revised Draft Treaty
is concerned with the use of the seabed, vehicles which can
navigate in the water above the seabed, that is submersible
vehicles, would most likely be viewed in the same way as any other
ships. Thus, there would appear to be no violation of the
prohibition if such vehicles were either anchored to or resting on
the seabed. 21 This interpretation is in line with the United States
position, namely, that the prohibition applies to activities on or
under the seabed and not in waters above the seabed where the
problem is complicated by already existing armament and by the
need to avoid infringement of the traditional principles of the
22
freedom of the seas.
B.

GeographicalCoverage

One of the most difficult questions facing the various
delegations at the negotiation of the revised Draft concerned the
geographical coverage of the proposed treaty. Nearly all members
of the Disarmament Committee shared the view of the United
States that the prohibition should apply to the broadest practical
area of the seabed, excluding only a narrow band with respect to
20. N.Y. Times Oct. 8, 1969 at 7.
21. Statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva on October 7, 1969, by U.S. representative James F. Leonard, 61 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 365, 366 (1969).
22. See statement made on March 28, 1969, before U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction by David
H. Popper, U.S. representative to the Committee. 60 DSP'T STATE BULL. 342, 343 (1969).
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the coastal state. Accordingly, paragraph 2 of Article I of the
revised Draft makes the prohibition extend also to the narrow
band, except that within that zone, it does not apply to the coastal
state.
While there were several methods by which this narrow band
could be determined, it was felt that the prospects for broad
acceptance of the treaty would be much greater if the treaty were
in line with the existing international law of the sea. Thus, the
solution incorporated in the revised Draft takes the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
(hereinafter referred to as "Convention") as the basis for
measuring the land. The suggested method is covered in two
provisions of the revised Draft. First, paragraph I of Article I
extends the treaty prohibitions to the entire seabed and ocean floor
"beyond the maximum contiguous zone" provided for in the
Convention. The maximum seabed limit of the contiguous zone
adopted in the Convention is twelve miles. 24 Second, under
paragraph 1 of Article II, the outer limit of this contiguous zone
must be measured from baselines drawn in accordance with the
detailed rules provided in Section II of Part I of the Convention
and "in accordance with international law."
The inclusion of the phrase "in accordance with international
law" was intended to cover such situations as "historic" bays.
Such bays would have been expressly excluded under Section II
of the Convention without this additional reference to
international law.
Initially, the United States took the view that large bays and
estuaries, such as Hudson Bay, should be considered part of the
open sea and, therefore, subject to the ban on nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union, however, insisted on the exemption of such
large bodies of water as the sea of Okhotsk, off the east coast of
Siberia, on the ground that as "historic" bays they had been
recognized as within the territorial sea?.
23. See statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva on May 22, 1969, by U.S. representative Adrian S. Fisher, 60 DEP'T STATE BULL,

520, 521 (1969).
24. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Article 24, Sept. 15,
1958 [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.

25. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1969 at 8.
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The ultimate accpetance of the Soviet view by the United
States regarding the exclusion of historic bays from the ban was
due in a large measure to the fact that Moscow dropped its
demand for a complete demilitarization of the ocean floor and
accepted, in turn, the United States' proposal that the ban be
limited to nuclear weapons and installations. Thus, the net result
was that in those situations where Section II rules are expressly
inapplicable under the terms of the 1958 Convention, the rules of
customary international law will govern the location of the
baseline for the purposes of the revised Draft. Therefore the twelve
mile contiguous zone would be measured from the closing line
across an historic bay only if the waters are regarded as internal
2
waters under the rules of customary international law. 1
In the course of the negotiations the United States made it
clear that the revised Draft's reference to the 1958 Convention to
define baselines in the outer limit of the exempted coastal. area in
no way implied that any party to the proposed treaty which is not
a party to the Convention would find itself bound by or adhering
to that Convention. Therefore, a party to the proposed seabed
treaty would accept only that the outer limits of the geographical
area exempted from the ban would be determined in accordance
with the Convention. For this reason, the party to the proposed
treaty would not accept these 1958 rules for any purpose other
than that of determining the geographical area to which the
agreement would apply.27 Nonetheless, the legal implications of
the revised Draft arising from what some delegations regarded as
an unnecessary reference to the 1958 Convention which, up to the
present time had not been adhered to by a majority of countries,
remained a somewhat bothersome issue even after the inclusion of
a so-called "disclaimer" clause in the proposed treaty. 28 Under
the disclaimer clause of the revised Draft nothing in the proposed
treaty must be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the
position of any party with respect to the rights or claims which
such party may assert, or with respect to recognition or
26. See the statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament
at Geneva on October 30, 1969, by U.S. representative James F. Leonard, 61 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 480,481 (1969).
27. Id. at 482.
28. 6 U.N. Chronicle 79 (1969).
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nonrecognition of rights of claims asserted by any other state,
related to waters off its coasts, or to the seabed and the ocean
floor.

29

With reference to the disclaimer clause the United States
delegate stated that his country recognized that there were
differing positions among states with respect to such matters as,
for example, the proper breadth of the territorial sea and that the
proposed treaty did not intend to settle such issues. Furthermore,
it was not the purpose of the treaty to give one state or another
state, or any group of states, an advantage vis-a-vis any other
state or group of states regarding law of the sea issues. That was
the reason why the United States regarded the disclaimer clause
the best that it had been possible for the authors of the revised
30
Draft to devise.
II.

VERIFICATION

The purpose of a genuine verification scheme is to provide
adequate assurance to the participating countries that all parties
to the agreement are fulfilling their obligations. The question of
what constitutes adequate verification in the light of present and
developing potentials, especially in view of the large scale technical
problems connected with operating in a hostile seabed
environment, carries no simple answer.
At the initial stages of the negotiations on verification
procedures both the United States and the Soviet Union believed
that it would be desirable to draw on the useful precedent of the
Outer Space Treaty to provide for a right of access based on
reasonable advance notice and reciprocity. Later on it was
realized, particularly by the United States, that it was difficult to
attempt to transplant the legal regime applicable to the moon
which is not subject to national appropriation, to the seabed which
is subject to existing claims of national jurisdiction and an
increasing array of scientific and commercial uses.3 Furthermore,
29. Article 11, paragraph 2, Revised Draft Treaty (Doec. CCD/269/Rev.).
Doc. A/7741.

30. See the statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament
at Geneva on October 30, 1969, by U.S. representative James F. Leonard, 61 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 480, 482 (1969).
3 1. See the statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament
at Geneva on March 25, 1969, by Gerard Smith, head of the U.S. Delegation to the
Conference. 60 DEP'T STATE BULL. 333, 336-7 (1969).
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it was also realized that the entry of an observer into any
installation on the seabed, at great depth or pressure, in addition
to being hazardous, would likely'be expensive in view of the
lengthy preparation and special equipment needed to enter each
particular type of facility. 2 In order to avoid these difficulties, the
United States proposed a simple verification system based on
observation and consultation to resolve any questions as to
compliance with the proposed treaty which the observation might
raise. The United States felt that if it could freely observe the
activities of other states on the ocean floor, such observation
would provide adequate assurance that a violation would not go
undetected.3
A.

Observation

With respect to the relative value of observation as an
effective tool in detecting violations, the United States was of the
opinion that the emplanting or emplacing on the ocean floor of
an installation that was part of an effective weapons sytem
involving nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction would be
unlikely to escape the attention of other maritime nations. Thus
installations, for instance, which had the capacity to
accommodate a missile for delivery of a nuclear weapon and
apertures from which such a missile could be launched, or which
had the capability to house a sophisticated control system, or
contained an airlock to permit entry of personnel, or contained
large parts, which could be detached for maintenance, would all
34
be observable with relative ease.
Furthermore, the United States believed that the vast
majority of states had ships and planes that could and did
consistently carry out surveillance of their territorial waters.
Photographs could be taken and data collected to evaluate the
particular activity and determine whether or not the ban had been
violated. Since the activities of states on and over the high seas
32. Such right to direct access was proposed in paragraph 4 of the Canadian working
paper. See Draft Treaty; U.N. Doc. A/7741.
33. See the statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament
at Geneva on May 22, 1969 by U.S. representative Adrian S. Fisher, 60 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 521-22 (1969).
34. See statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva on May 22, 1969, by U.S. representative Adrian S. Fisher, 60 DEP'T STATE BULL.
520, 522 (1969).
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were not subject to the kind of restrictions that applied in the case
of inspections conducted within national territory, so long as such
activities took place within the area subject to the ban and did not
interfere with the activities of the other states concerned,
observation could be carried out as frequently and as closely as
the circumstances warranted. Such procedures would not conflict
with the traditional principles of the freedom of the seas and other
35
prevailing rules of international law .
It may be pointed out that the 500-meter safety zone
permitted under the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf"
would not necessarily frustrate any attempt at verification by
precluding an examination within 500 meters of a particular
installation inasmuch as a relatively close and continuous
observation would still be possible beyond the 500-meter distance.
Also, it would be unlikely that a potential violator of the proposed
ban would reveal the precise location of his planned violation by
giving due notice of the installation and its safety zone as provided
37
in the aforementioned convention.
The revised Draft does not specify observation as a means by
which verification could be carried out but there is no doubt that
any meaningful right to verify would include the right to observe.
Thus paragraph 1 of Article III of the revised Draft simply states
that the parties shall have the right to verify the activities of the
other parties to the proposed treaty on the seabed and the ocean
floor and subsoil thereof beyond the 12-mile limit, without
interfering with such activities or otherwise infringing rights
recognized under international law, including the freedom of the
high seas.
B. Assistance and Consultation
In the course of the negotiations a number of delegations felt
that in view of the differences in technological developments
among states, provisions should be made to enable less advanced
states to obtain assistance from technologically more advanced
nations in carrying out verification.
35. See the statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament
at Geneva on October 16, 1969 by U.S. representative James F. Leonard, 61 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 425,426-27 (1969).
36. Convention on the Continental Shelf, June 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311.
37. Id. at 427.
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The United States believed that efforts to work out specific
procedures for assistance would be premature, in view of
uncertainty about what was involved, and would also raise severe
problems of resource allocation in view of the shortage of
equipment and personnel for the highly specialized activities
required on the seabed. With respect to a Canadian suggestion
that states should have "the right" to apply to another state party
for assistance, thereby implying that another state party may have
a corresponding duty to provide assistance, the United States felt
that it could not in good faith accept such obligation largely
because of the existing state of technology and the ever-shifting
political relations among the large number of countries that might
38
become party to the proposed treaty.
In the course of the deliberations it has also been suggested
that the United Nations might be a possible source or channel of
assistance. The United Nations' role in verification seemed logical
since this is the organization charged with the responsibility of
maintaining international peace and security. However, it was the
view of the United States that the Charter of the United Nations
already contained provisions for dealing with possible threats to
peace and that it would be a mistake to attempt to turn the
question of verification over to the United Nations. Instead,
recourse should be had to informal procedures involving
consultation and cooperation among states that share common
interests in certain areas of the seabed. Such states could work out
their own arrangements within the framework of routine
diplomacy.39
Since some delegations expressed doubt about the efficacy of
such procedures, the United States' representative gave assurance
that if the United States were to ask for consultations, it would
not propose to let the consultations drop until all queries were
resolved to its satisfaction. The United States stressed that this
procedure involving verification by observation and consultation
would be open to all signatories to the proposed treaty. Thus,
international consultation would have a major role to play in
38. Id.
39. Id.
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verifying compliance, without the necessity of resorting to an
international verification organization, which the United States
regarded as premature and wasteful of resources. 0
In those relatively few cases where consultations might not
lead to fruitful results, or where a party might have serious doubts
about the observance of the prohibitions, the United States felt
that existing United Nations' procedures were sufficient without
any additional stipulation for bringing such questions to the
attention of the Security Council. Nonetheless, after taking into
consideration the arguments and criticisms advanced by other
delegations, the United States' representative expressed his
readiness to examine how the Charter of the United Nations
might be used to reinforce the provisions of the proposed treaty. 41
As provided in paragraph 2 of Article II I, the revised Draft
permits verification to be carried out by a party either by its own
means or with the assistance of any other party. The verification
article also includes a commitment by the parties to consult and
cooperate in order to clear up questions that might arise about
fulfillment of the obligations of the proposed treaty. In the event
that consultation and cooperation have not removed the doubts
concerning the fulfillment of the assumed obligations, the parties
may, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, refer the
matter to the Security Council.42
III. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Additional administrative provisions of the revised Draft deal
with such matters as amendment, review, withdrawal, signature,
43
entry into force, and the like.
40. See statement made before the conference of the Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva on May 22, 1969, by U.S. representative Adrian S. Fisher, 60 DEP'T STATE BULL.
520,522 (1969).
41. In the course of the deliberations several delegations have advocated notification

and participation or association of the coastal state which is a party to the proposed treaty
in verification activities in the vicinity of its continental shelf. While the United States
understood that the coastal states did not wish to see verification utilized somehow to
prejudice their exclusive right to exploit the reources of their own continental shelves, it
felt that the suggested procedures would be an unnecessary and undesirable restriction on
the right of a party to verify the activities of others. See paragraph 6(c) of the Canadian
working paper (Doc. CCD/270) and the statement made before the conference of the
Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on October 16, 1969 by U.S. represnetative James
F. Leonard, 61 DP'T STATE BULL. 425,428 et sec. (1969).

42. Paragraph 3 of Art. III, Draft Treaty, U.N. Doc. A/7741.
43. See Articles IV-VIII, Draft Treaty, U.N. Doc. A/7741.
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With respect to amendment, any state party to the proposed
treaty may propose amendments. For entry into force of the
amendments, acceptance by a majority of all parties is required.
The amendments shall be binding only on those parties who have
accepted them. 4 These provisions are aimed to assure that all
parties will have an equal voice in deciding which amendments
will become parts of the proposed treaty.
During the deliberations of the Disarmament Committee,
many delegations supported the idea of a review conference so
that if technological and other developments would warrant
revision of the verification procedures, they could be considered
at such meeting. Accordingly, the revised Draft provides that five
years after the entry into force of the proposed treaty a conference
would be held to review the operation of the proposed treaty
5
taking account of any relevant technological developments.
The withdrawal provision of the revised Draft is patterned
after paragraph 1, Article X of the Nonproliferation Treaty.4" It
provides that each party shall have the right to withdraw if it
decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
the proposed treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A
notice of such withdrawl, including a statement of the
extraordinary events, must be given to all other parties and to the
47
United Nations Security Council three months in advance.
Finally, with respect to signature and entry into force, the
revised Draft provides that the proposed treaty shall be open for
signature (accession) to all states and shall enter into force after
22 countries had ratified it.48 In this connection, the United States
wished to make clear that accession by an unrecognized regime
or entity to the proposed treaty, would in no way affect the
recognition or status of such regime vis-a-vis the other parties.
44. It may be noted that Article XV of the Outer Space Treaty provides for
amendments to that treaty in language identical to that used in Article IV of the revised
Draft.
45. Art. V, Revised Draft Treaty (Doc. CCD/269/Rev.).
46. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2373
(XXII) June 18, 1968.
47. Art. VI, Revised Draft Treaty (Doc. CCD/269/Rev.).
48. Id. at VII, paras. I and 3. It may be noted that the ratification procedure follows
the provisions set forth in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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FINAL OBSERVATIONS

There can be little doubt that a widely accepted treaty
meaningfully restricting the deployment of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor would
substantially contribute to the security of all nations. It is
somewhat unfortunate, thereforie, that the carefully drafted
provisions-which were agreed upon by the United States and the
Soviet Union and were subsequently revised by them in the light
of comments and criticisms by other countries-have failed to
elicit sufficient support from the United Nations to receive the
latter's endorsement.
As we have seen, most of the major concerns of other nations
centered around three major areas. First, there was the concern
that the proposed treaty should not be limited to nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction but should reflect a broader
agreement and progress toward arms control. Second, there was
the fear that the revised Draft did not sufficiently serve to protect
the security interests of all parties and particularly those of the
coastal states. Third, there was a strong desire that the proposed
treaty should more clearly reflect that it in no way prejudices or
infringes on existing rights recognized under international law,
except for the limitations regarding arms deployment on activities
falling within the scope of the proposed treaty.
It is hoped that in the new round of negotiations a formula
will be found which will be able to satisfy the most pressing
demands of other nations and which will be acceptable to the
United States and the Soviet Union. It is also hoped that the
agreement on such formula will be reached quickly since it might
be much more difficult, if not impossible, to reach an
understanding once nuclear deployments on the ocean floor have
started.

